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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have experienced
phenomenal growth over the past decade. They are typically
deployed in remote and hostile environments for monitoring ap-
plications and data collection. Miniature sensor nodes collaborate
with each other to provide information on an unprecedented
temporal and spatial scale. The resource-constrained nature
of sensor nodes along with human-inaccessible terrains poses
various security challenges to these networks at different layers.
In this paper, we propose a novel detection scheme for Sybil
attack in a centralized clustering-based hierarchical network.
Sybil nodes are detected prior to cluster formation to prevent
their forged identities from participating in cluster head selection.
Only legitimate nodes are elected as cluster heads to enhance
utilization of the resources. The proposed scheme requires
collaboration of any two high energy nodes to analyze received
signal strengths of neighbouring nodes. The simulation results
show that our proposed scheme significantly improves network
lifetime in comparison with existing clustering-based hierarchical
routing protocols.
Index Terms—Wireless Sensor Network, Sybil Attack, Base
Station, Cluster, Cluster Head
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of small sensor
nodes working together to monitor and obtain data about an
environment [1]. Sensor nodes have limited resources in terms
of energy, computation, storage, transmission range and avail-
able bandwidth. They are typically deployed in a remote or
hostile location and are left unattended to perform monitoring
and reporting tasks. Therefore, limited resources of nodes
need to be utilized efficiently in order to prolong network
lifetime and obtain better throughput. These networks have
been successfully deployed in a wide range of applications
such as military surveillance, health care and environmental
monitoring are few to mention [2].
Most WSNs are deployed for mission-critical tasks for an
unspecified duration of time [3]. Therefore, security consid-
erations need to be in place at the time of network design.
The resource-constrained nature of these networks coupled
with their unique characteristics, such as dynamic topology,
in-network processing, error-prone communication links and
scalability makes security provisioning challenging and com-
plicated. In addition, these networks are left unattended with-
out human intervention and base station supervision. Instead,
sensor-collected data is harvested intermittently by a base
station [4]. Since data are retained on individual sensors,
securing these data is both important and challenging. Sensor
nodes operating in unattended environments face a higher risk
of security breaches. If any one of these nodes is compromised,
its sensitive data and security parameters will be retrieved by
an adversary to participate in malicious activities.
These networks face a diverse range of security challenges
at various layers. For example, it is very challenging to detect
Sybil attacks, where an adversary forges fake identities to
legitimate nodes. An adversary may either fabricate such iden-
tities or steal them from legitimate nodes by disabling them
permanently [5]. A single physical node may forge multiple
identities to influence the outcome of data aggregation, fair
resource allocation and voting on suspicious nodes [6].
The unstructured and distributed environment along with
broadcast nature of communication in WSNs suits well to
Sybil attacks. Various protection mechanisms have been de-
veloped to guard nodes against this type of attacks. A voting-
based protection approach allows the nodes to determine
if identities of a suspected node are legitimate or not [5].
However, a Sybil node may use its forged identities to vouch
for each other and influence the outcome of voting. In [7],
an authentication-based detection scheme was proposed which
allowed the nodes to use certificates and shared encryption
keys to detect Sybil attacks. The proposed scheme is compu-
tationally complex and requires significant resources on each
node. In [8], the authors adopted a probabilistic approach using
neighbourhood information. They argued that it was highly
improbable for two nodes to have exactly the same set of
neighbours in a densely deployed WSN. In [9], a received
signal strength indicator (RSSI) approach was proposed which
required coordination of at least four nodes to detect Sybil
attacks.
All of detection techniques mentioned above are designed
for data-centric routing protocols in which flooding is used
to regulate traffic flow. Flooding allows intermediate nodes to
broadcast data and control packets on their ways to base station
from source nodes [10]. Duplicate packets keep circulating
in the network which causes excessive energy consumption,
delay, congestion, implosion and overlapping [11].
In this paper, we propose a lightweight Sybil attack de-
tection scheme for a centralized clustering-based hierarchical
network. Clustering approach significantly prolongs network
lifespan by avoiding direct communication among nodes and
a base station [12]. Our proposed scheme has two main
objectives. First, we design a Sybil attack detection scheme
which requires collaboration of only two nodes. Second,
we implement our scheme for a centralized clustering-based
hierarchical network to prevent Sybil nodes from participating
in cluster head selection as these nodes are capable of forming
multiple virtual clusters using their forged identities. There-
fore, our proposed approach is lightweight in terms of Sybil
attack detection and efficient in terms of prolonging network
lifetime, cluster head selection, energy consumption, packet
loss rate and packet delivery ratio.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, related work from literature for Sybil attack detection and
clustering-based hierarchical routing protocols is provided. In
Section III, we present a brief description of our proposed
scheme followed by experimental work in Section IV. Finally,
the paper is concluded and directions for future research are
provided in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide related research works on Sybil
attack detection and applications to clustering-based hierarchi-
cal routing protocols using our proposed scheme.
Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) [13]
was designated as a pioneer protocol among clustering-based
hierarchical routing protocols. LEACH partitions a sensor field
into small geographical regions known as clusters. Each cluster
has a cluster head node which collects and aggregates data
from member nodes and transmits to a base station. The
protocol operates in rounds and nodes take turn to become
cluster heads in subsequent rounds for uniform distribution
of energy load. The problem with LEACH protocol is the
probabilistic selection of cluster heads using random number
generation. Each node, n, chooses a random number between
0 and 1. If this number is less than the threshold value, T (n),
defined in Equation 1, the node is elected as a cluster head





, if n ∈ G,
0, otherwise.
(1)
Here, kopt is the optimal number of cluster heads in each
round, r is the current round and G is the set of nodes that
have not been elected as cluster heads in the past 1kopt rounds.
The probabilistic selection of cluster heads has a potential
risk of low energy nodes being elected as cluster heads in
subsequent rounds. Moreover, Equation 1 cannot guarantee an
optimal number of cluster heads in each round. In [14], the
authors argued that cluster heads need to be elected based on
the residual energy of the nodes. They suggested the inclusion
of residual energy of nodes in Equation 1. However, it will not
solve the problem because cluster heads are still elected using
a random number generation. To solve this problem, nodes
need to be elected by a central controller or base station. In
[15], the authors proposed a centralized approach for cluster
head selection. Nodes having remaining energy greater than
the average residual energy are elected as cluster heads in
each round. However, it is highly probable that there will be
a large number of such nodes in each round which will result
in too many cluster heads. In [16], we proposed a centralized
scheme which elected an optimal percentage of cluster heads
(5 percent of total nodes). Each round results in balanced
clusters which enhance network stability, scalability and data
aggregation. Moreover, the proposed approach reduces net-
work load, energy consumption and congestion.
In WSNs, communication over an error-prone wireless
channel exposes nodes to various types of malicious activities.
One of them is a Sybil attack, where an adversary forges
multiple identities to mislead legitimate nodes into believing
that they are having many neighbours. In [5], the authors
proposed a radio resource testing approach for detecting forged
identities. They assumed that a sensor node was incapable
of simultaneous transmission or reception on a single radio.
Moreover, a physical node may forge multiple identities but
is incapable to use a single channel for these identities at
a given time. Apart from radio resource testing, they also
proposed a key validation approach for random key pre-
distribution. However, it requires excessive resources of a
node, is computationally complex and requires ample amounts
of memory space. In [8], the authors proposed a scheme based
on the assumption that probability of two nodes having exactly
the same set of neighbours was extremely low provided that
a network had high node density. They argued that forged
identities typically had the same set of neighbours because
they were associated with the same physical device. Therefore,
presence of a malicious node can easily be detected by
checking neighbourhood of the suspected victim of a Sybil
attack. In [9], the authors proposed an RSSI-based solution
for Sybil attack detection. They argued that even though RSSI
was a time-varying parameter and unreliable in nature, using
RSSI ratio from multiple receivers may be used for Sybil
attack detection. In [17], the authors proposed an identity-
based detection scheme for Sybil and spoofing attacks in IEEE
802.11 and WSNs. The proposed scheme uses a detector to
identity malicious activities of malevolent entities capable of
adjusting their transmission power. The detector locates the
positions of these entities and eradicates them from network
participation.
In WSNs, the detection techniques for Sybil attacks are
typically designed for data-centric and location-based routing
protocols. These protocols mostly rely on flooding [18] for
routing data from source nodes to a base station. The broadcast
nature of these protocols generates too many duplicate packets
enroute to a base station. The above techniques for Sybil
attack detection achieve their goal at the expense of excessive
delay, congestion, packet duplication and energy consumption.
To overcome the shortcomings of flooding, gossiping was
proposed [19]. In gossiping, each node transmits a packet
randomly to one of its neighbours. Gossiping ensures that each
node receives a single copy of packet being sent. However,
random selection of a neighbouring node is a risky task
because a neighbour may be a Sybil node.
In this paper, we propose a lightweight scheme for Sybil
attack detection. The proposed scheme requires coordination
of any two high energy nodes and performs detection using
signal strength of received packets. We use clustering-based
hierarchical architecture to detect forged identities of an ad-
versary. Each node transmits control packets to its two nearest
high energy nodes. The control packets contain residual energy
and identity of a node. Both high energy nodes calculate signal
strength of the received packets and exchange it using a half-
duplex communication channel to calculate RSSI ratio. After
a certain amount of time, the same operation is performed to
calculate a new RSSI ratio using signal strength of received
packets from the same node. If the new ratio is equal to the
one previously calculated and identities of the node in received
packets are also different, it means that the node has forged
its identities. Each node in the network undergoes a similar
operation for identity verification. The goal of our proposed
scheme is to prevent Sybil nodes from participation in cluster
head selection. If a Sybil node is elected as cluster head, it
will wreak havoc in a network by forming virtual clusters and
using its forged identities as a cluster heads for each cluster.
III. DETECTION OF SYBIL ATTACK IN A CENTRALIZED
CLUSTERING-BASED HIERARCHICAL NETWORK
In our proposed scheme, sensor nodes are classified accord-
ing to their energy levels at the time of network deployment.
Each node is either an ordinary sensing node or high energy
node. The ordinary sensing nodes are equipped with 2 joules
while high energy nodes are having 5 joules of energy.
High energy nodes are of only 5 percent of total nodes to
balance network cost and assist the base station in Sybil attack
detection and in relaying vital information. In our scheme, only
ordinary sensing nodes are eligible to be elected as cluster
heads.
To minimize the consequences of a malicious activity,
Sybil nodes are barred from cluster head selection. In doing
so, network stability, efficiency and energy consumption are
enhanced. If a Sybil node is elected as cluster head, it will
exhaust network resources by forging multiple identities to
legitimate nodes. In Figure 1, a Sybil node forges five different
identities to sensor nodes in its vicinity. In WSNs, each node
has the ability to adjust its transmission power to reach a
far distant node [20]. A single Sybil node can form multiple
clusters with each one of its identity as a separate cluster head.
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In a distributed LEACH protocol, the base station has little
control over cluster formation and cluster head selection. Each
node (including Sybil nodes) can elect itself as a cluster head
based on a generated random number, so LEACH is highly
vulnerable to Sybil attacks. Each self-elected Sybil node can
form multiple clusters, maliciously manipulating and aggre-
gating data and transmitting to a base station. Instead, error-
prone redundant data may be delivered to the base station at
the expense of actual data [21]. High energy nodes have a vital
role in Sybil attack detection and are constantly monitored by
a base station. High energy nodes refrain themselves from






Fig. 1. A Single Sybil Node Forming Multiple Clusters
In view of the above discussion, we propose a novel Sybil
attack detection scheme for a centralized clustering-based
hierarchical network. Initially, high energy nodes identify
Sybil nodes and report them to a base station to avoid their
participation in cluster head selection. It ensures that only
legitimate nodes can be elected as cluster heads in each
round. Next, the base station elects an optimal number of
cluster heads in each round based on an average energy
threshold level. To the best of our knowledge, our proposed
scheme is the first for Sybil attack detection in clustering-
based hierarchical network. A brief overview of our proposed
scheme is presented here.
A. Sybil Attack Detection
We use the concept of an RSSI for detection of Sybil attacks.
A variable number of Sybil nodes (having 2 joule of energy)
with multiple forged identities are injected before the start of
each round. The objective of our scheme is to prevent their
participation in cluster head selection.
Initially, each node broadcasts control packets to its two
nearest high energy nodes as shown in Figure 2. This message
contains its identity and residual energy. Theorem 5 in [22]
argued that if atleast four sensor nodes monitor radio signals
from a neighbouring node, it will not be able to hide its
location. However, for a resource-constrained WSN, it is
computationally complex task which requires abundant of
network resources. To reduce the processing complexity, we
propose a lightweight scheme for Sybil attack detection which
requires coordination of any two high energy nodes.
Suppose that, high energy nodes, hen1 and hen2, receive
control packets from node i at time t1. If the identity of node
i in control packets is x, then the RSSI, Rxhen1, is calculated





Here, Pt is the transmitted power, k is constant, dhen1 is the
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Fig. 2. High Energy Nodes Collaboration for Sybil Attack Detection
path-loss exponent. The value of α depends on the deployed
environment. Its value is 2 for free-space, 1.6 to 1.8 for line-
of-sight connection and 4 to 6 for buildings with obstructions
[23]. The value of α for a free-space environment is computed
using Equation 3. Here, λ is the wavelength of a radio signal.




The transmitted power, Pt, is related to received power, Pr,





The location of node i with respect to hen1 can be com-
puted by solving the Euclidean distance given in Equation 5.
dhen1 =
√
(xhen1 − xi)2 − (yhen1 − yi)2. (5)
Solving Equations 3, 4 and 5 and substituting their values
in Equation 2 enable hen1 to calculate the RSSI value, Rxhen1.
At this point, hen1 creates its own control packet and appends
the value of signal strength, Rxhen1, in it and transmits to
its nearest high energy node, hen2. Recall that hen2 has
received a similar control packet from node i at time t1 and
has calculated the value of Rxhen2 using a similar procedure
as hen1. Next, hen2 calculates the radio signal strength ratio
















)α and t = t1. (7)
At time, t1+ t0, node i again broadcasts control packets with
a different identity, y. High energy nodes, hen1 and hen2
perform similar operations as before and coordinate with each
other to calculate the radio signal strength ratio at hen2 as






)α and t = t1 + t0. (8)
At this point of time, hen2 compares the ratios obtained at
time t1 and t1 + t0. If the difference between these ratios
is very close to zero as indicated in Equation 9, then hen2









A single physical node, i has forged two identities, x and y,
to its nearest high energy nodes at different time intervals. As
the radio signal strength ratios are equal, location is in fact
the same for alleged multiple identities. The complete process
of Sybil attack detection is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Detection of Sybil Attack
1: Input: Ei, n, IDN , s, m, α, k
2: Output: {Sybil or non-Sybil}
3: syb=round(rand(1)∗s)+1; . Sybil generation
4: id=round(rand(1)∗m); . Generate m identities
. Next, each node is associated with high energy nodes
5: for i = 1 to N do . N=n+s
6: for b = 1 to 5 do . Five high energy nodes
7: Calculate Euclidean distance between i and b, dbi
8: Sort di in ascending order to get two nearest high energy
nodes, b′ and b′′, where b′, b′′ ∈ b
At time, t1
9: SEND (Ei, IDi), ∀ i ∈ N . Each node sends its
control packets to b′ and b′′
10: Calculate Rb′ . Check identity of i
11: Calculate Rb′′ . Check identity of i
. Rb′ , Rb′′ are the received signal strengths at b′ and b′′
12: b′ transmits Rb′ to b
′′
13: Calculate Rb′′/Rb′ . Calculated at b′′
At time, t1 + t0
14: Repeat step 9-13 . Check identity of i
15: Compare ratios . Obtained at time, t1 and t1 + t0
16: if Ratios are equal and having similar identities for i
then
Node i is Sybil
17: else
Node i is non-Sybil
B. Centralized Clustering-based Hierarchical Protocol
In Figure 2, each high energy node monitors its nearest
neighbours for a possible Sybil attack. Upon detection, Sybil
nodes are reported to a base station located outside a sen-
sor field. Each high energy node creates a control packet
containing residual energy and identities of ordinary sensing
nodes along with forged identities of detected Sybil nodes and
transmits to a base station which makes the final decision on
cluster head selection. The base station maintains two queues,
one for blacklisted Sybil nodes and one for ordinary sensing
nodes. It monitors the status of both queues at regular intervals.
The procedure of Sybil attack detection is repeated at the
start of each round before cluster formation and cluster head
selection. Once a Sybil node is detected, it is blacklisted to
withhold its participation in cluster head selection. Clearly,
there is a trade-off between the cost of Sybil attack detection
and energy consumption of high energy nodes. High energy
nodes remain active before the start of each round to detect
new Sybil nodes. Furthermore, they avoid communication with
already blacklisted Sybil nodes to preserve their energy levels.
The base station evaluates residual energy of ordinary
sensing nodes to derive an average energy threshold, Eavg ,







Here, n is the total number of ordinary sensing nodes in a
network and is equal to N -s, where, N is the set of all nodes
including s Sybil nodes and Ei is the residual energy of an
ordinary sensing node.
An ordinary sensing node having residual energy greater
than average energy threshold is eligible for cluster head
selection. However, it is probable that there will be a large
number of such nodes in each round. These nodes are potential
candidates for cluster heads in a particular round as shown in
Figure 3. It is the job of base station to elect a desire number
of cluster heads among candidate nodes. In our scheme, the
following criteria are used for cluster head selection:
• Residual energy of a candidate is greater than or equal
to average energy threshold.
• Candidate is not elected as cluster head during the past
1
p rounds.
• Two or more candidates located in a same geographical
region are evaluated based on their residual energy and
previous history of selection.
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Fig. 3. Cluster Head Selection Procedure
In Figure 3, the base station stores residual energy of
ordinary sensing nodes in a queue. It then computes the
average residual energy, Eavg (1.5 joules in this case). An
ordinary sensing node having residual energy greater than or
equal to 1.5 joules is nominated as a candidate for cluster head.
All candidates are evaluated according to the specified criteria.
If two or more candidates are located in a same geographical
region, they are evaluated according to their residual energies
and their selections as cluster heads in the past 1p rounds. For
example, residual energy of node 2 is lower as compared to
node 11 but the latter was elected in the past 1p rounds in
Figure 3.
In our proposed scheme, the optimal percentage of cluster
heads are 5 percent for a network of 100 nodes. An optimal
percentage of such nodes is one major factor that influences
the performance of clustering-based hierarchical WSNs. A
cluster head consumes more energy on aggregating data and
relaying vital information to base station and performs general
route maintenance and some other similar tasks [24]. If a
small set of cluster heads are elected, network lifetime will
degrade because these nodes will spend extra energy in data
aggregation and long-haul transmission to base station. On the
other hand, the selection of more cluster heads will make a
clustering network rather inefficient and ineffective.
The base station elects an optimal percentage of cluster
heads for a particular round and broadcasts nomination packets
containing their identities. Each cluster head advertises itself
to nearest neighbouring nodes which evaluate the received
signal strength from multiple cluster heads. A neighbouring
node associates itself with a cluster head having the strongest
signal strength to form a cluster as shown in Figure 4. The
selection of cluster head and formation of cluster is known
as set-up phase. The completion of set-up phase is followed
by initiation of steady-state phase during which each cluster
head allocates time division multiple access (TDMA) slots
within its cluster for sharing the transmission medium. This
concept of slot allocation enables sensing nodes to remain
inactive for most of their lifetime and at the same time avoids
contention for transmission over a wireless link. Each cluster
head collects data within its cluster in a particular round
and transmits it to the nearest high energy node. A cluster
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head may transmit data directly to a base station, however,
in view of limited resources of a node, data is delivered to
the nearest high energy node which in turn transmits to the
base station. In doing so, energy load is uniformly distributed
which prolongs the network lifetime. The flowchart of Figure
5 shows the complete process of set-up and steady-state phases
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Fig. 4. Set-up and Steady-state Phases
Next, we calculate the energy consumption of various nodes
during set-up and steady-state phases. The energy consumption
of an ordinary sensing node in a particular cluster depends on
its distance from its respective cluster head and is computed
using Equation 11.
E(k, dCH) = kEelec + Eamp(k, dCH). (11)
Here, E(k, dCH) is the energy consumption in transmitting k-
bits packet to a cluster head over a distance dCH , Eelec is the
energy dissipated by radio of a node and Eamp is the energy
dissipated by its amplifier in achieving an acceptable signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR), EbN0 . The value of Eamp depends on the
distance between an ordinary sensing node and its cluster head.
If the distance, dCH , is less than crossover distance, dc, a free-
space propagation model is used, otherwise a multipath fading
model is used [16]. The values of E(k, dCH) with respect to






CH , dCH < dc,
kEelec + kmpd
4
CH , dCH ≥ dc.
(12)
Here, fs and mp are the energy consumption of an amplifier
in the free-space propagation model and the multipath fading







The free-space propagation model assumes an ideal condi-
tion for transmission in which there is a line-of-sight connec-
tion between an ordinary sensing node and its cluster head. In
contrast, a radio signal reaches by two or more different paths
in the multipath fading model due to reflection, refraction and
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Fig. 5. Centralized Clustering-based Hierarchical Concept
Once a cluster head receives data from all its clustering
members, it aggregates the data to reduce its size without
compromising its quality. The aggregated data is further trans-
mitted to a nearest high energy node for ultimate transmission
to a base station. The energy consumption of a cluster head
is significantly higher than a non-cluster head node and is




















HEN , dHEN ≥ dc.
(14)
Here, EDA is the energy consumption in data aggregation,
k is the message size, kopt is the optimal number of cluster
heads and dHEN is the distance between a cluster head and its
nearest high energy node and its value determines the type of
model (free-space or multipath) to be used by a cluster head
in calculating its energy consumption. Our proposed scheme
is based on the idea of balanced-clustering technique in which
the number of cluster heads is equal to the number of clusters
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[25]. Optimal number of cluster heads, kopt, ensures that each
round will have balanced clusters in which there will be one
cluster head per cluster.
The energy consumption of high energy nodes differs from
one to another. Before the start of each round, ordinary sensing
nodes and Sybil nodes transmit their control packets to their
two nearest high energy nodes at two different time intervals.
All five high energy nodes are involved in computationally
complex task of Sybil attack detection and the strength calcu-
lation of received signals based on the control packets.
In our scheme, hen1 calculates only the received signal
strength values of incoming packets. However, the actual
decision about the type (Sybil or non-Sybil) of a node is
taken by hen2. Clearly, hen2 consumes more energy because
of the additional task of finding the type of a node. Therefore,
each high energy node is classified as either a received signal
strength calculator (rssc) or a Sybil detector (sd). In view of
the above discussion, hen1 is an rssc while hen2 is an sd for
node i mentioned in Section III. It is important to mention here
that an sd node performs dual functionality of signal strength
calculation and Sybil detection. The energy consumption of














BS , dnHEN < dc,
Eelec × 2
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BS , dnHEN ≥ dc.
(15)
Here, ctr is the control packet sent by each node, x. dnHEN
is the distance between the rssc and its nearest sd and
dCH−HEN is the distance between the cluster head and
its nearest high energy node. Recall that each cluster head
transmits its data to the nearest high energy node for ultimate
transmission to the base station. Each node transmits two con-
trol packets to its two nearest high energy nodes to determine
its type. Furthermore, each rssc transmits a control packet
to its nearest sd which contains the received signal strength
value. The size of the control packet, ctr, is much smaller than
the data packet, k.
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BS , dBS ≥ dc.
(16)
The extra energy consumed by the sd node is due to
the received control packets from its counterpart rssc node.
Furthermore, an sd node also consumes energy in transmitting
control packets containing the identities and energy levels of
ordinary sensing nodes along with the forged identities of
detected Sybil nodes.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide a series of simulation results for
our proposed scheme. Our network comprises of n ordinary
sensing nodes in a 100 × 100 square meter area. A variable
number (denoted by s) of Sybil nodes with multiple identities
are injected in each round. The Sybil nodes and ordinary
sensing nodes have the same residual energy of 2 Joules. Table
I shows the parameters of our experimental work.
TABLE I
PARAMETERS AND THEIR VALUES
Simulation Parameters Values
Number of ordinary sensing nodes, n 100
Number of high energy nodes, HEN 5
Energy consumed by electronic component, Eelec 50 nJ/bit
Energy consumed in data aggregation, EDA 5 nJ/bit/packet
Energy consumed by amplifier in free-space, fs 100 pJ/bit/m2
Energy consumed by amplifier in multipath, mp 0.013 pJ/bit/m4
Length of data packet, k 2000 bits
Length of control packet, ctr 40 bits
Number of rounds, r 25000
Down-sampling rate of signal 500
Next, we evaluate our scheme in terms of number of
detected Sybil nodes, total number of candidates and opti-
mal selection of cluster heads, energy consumption, network
lifetime, packet loss rate and packet acceptance ratio.
A. Detection of Sybil Nodes
In our proposed scheme, a random number of Sybil nodes
having a variable number of forged identities are injected in
the network before the start of each round. It is the job of
high energy nodes to refrain Sybil nodes from cluster head
selection. In Figure 6, the total number of Sybil nodes and their
average number of forged identities detected in each round are
shown.

























Number of detected Sybil Nodes
Average Number of Identities per Sybil Node
Fig. 6. Detection Rate of Sybil Nodes and their Forged Identities
In Figure 6, the number of Sybil nodes are as high as 20
and the average number of their forged identities have reached
upto 5 in certain rounds. It would have an adverse impact
on the outcome of voting, data aggregation and fair resource
utilization if these nodes had gone undetected and were elected
as cluster heads.
B. Total Number of Candidates and Cluster Heads
Our proposed scheme prevents Sybil nodes from participa-
tion in cluster head selection process. If the detection scheme
is not in place, Sybil nodes may elect themselves as potential
candidates for cluster heads as shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7 depicts the significance of high energy nodes
in Sybil attack detection. In comparison with Figure 6, it
is obvious that the majority of Sybil nodes are capable to
nominate themselves as potential candidates for cluster heads.
However, our detection scheme prevents their participation
in cluster head selection. The performance of base station is
highly precise and accurate because it elects only 5 cluster
6
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Candidates Exclude Sybil Nodes
Cluster Heads in Each Round
Fig. 7. Candidates vs. Cluster Heads
heads in each round until the network has insufficient number
of alive nodes toward the end. The optimal selection of cluster
heads and prevention of Sybil nodes from participation in
cluster head selection efficiently utilize energy of the nodes
and enhance network lifetime.
C. Energy Consumption with Sybil Nodes
Total energy consumption of our scheme varies with the
number of Sybil nodes and their forged identities in each
round. In Figure 8, we calculate the amount of energy con-
sumed in each round in presence and absence of Sybil nodes.
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Fig. 8. Energy Consumption in Presence of Sybil Nodes
This increase in energy consumption is contributed much
toward the control packets transmitted by Sybil nodes. Fur-
thermore, locations of ordinary sensing nodes and Sybil nodes
with respect to high energy nodes and base station have direct
impact on energy consumption of the network.
D. Network Lifetime
The lifetime of a network is defined in terms of number
of rounds it remains functional. In Figure 9, we compare
the lifetime of our proposed network model with LEACH
and Stable Election Protocol (SEP) [26]. Both LEACH and
SEP randomly elect cluster heads using probabilistic threshold
values and result in an excessive number of such nodes in
various rounds.
In Figure 9, we define lifetime for clustering-based hierar-
chical networks in terms of rounds for two threshold values,
i.e., 90 % and 10% of alive nodes. For 90% alive nodes,
our network lifetime is 6989 rounds while LEACH and SEP





























Fig. 9. Lifetime of the Network
10% alive nodes, our network lifetime is 10822 rounds while
LEACH and SEP have a liftime of 5363 and 5902 rounds
respectively. Our simulation results show that our proposed
scheme significantly improves network lifetime as compared
to LEACH and SEP.
E. Packet Loss Rate
The traffic flow of our network is distributed in nature
which allows us to use a random uniform model [27] to
compute wireless transmission losses due to noise, interference
and other channel impairments. The packet loss rate is the
percentage of packets lost in the network over a specified
duration such as the number of rounds.


























Fig. 10. Packet Loss Rate
The random uniform model shown in [27] calculates the
probability of distributed packet losses with a mean value, p.
Hence, we plot the packet loss rate for different values of p in
Figure 10. From this figure, it is clear that the percentage of
packet loss is higher at 35%. The mean value of p determines
the quality of a network. In case of our network, the packet
loss rate does not reach the threshold levels (15%, 25% and
35%) in most of the rounds which means that the network is
sustainable and delivers most of the data required for decision-
making at the base station.
F. Packet Acceptance Ratio
The packet acceptance ratio is defined as the number of
packets successfully received at a base station to the number of
transmitted packets. Packet acceptance ratio for our proposed
network model is shown in Figure 11.
Packet acceptance ratio varies with the quality of commu-
nication links. The better the quality of links is, the higher the
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Fig. 11. Packet Acceptance Ratio
acceptance ratio is. Furthermore, it also depends on numer-
ous other factors such as queuing capacity of cluster heads
and high energy nodes, upstream traffic flow, data rate and
interference are few to mention.
V. CONCLUSION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have the ability of oper-
ating in remote, hazardous and hard-to-access locations. Tiny
sensor nodes operating on small batteries are left unattended
for an unspecified period of time for data acquisition and moni-
toring various applications. The absence of human intervention
and remote monitoring of applications expose these networks
to a wide range of security challenges at different layers.
Among them, one such challenging threat is the presence of
Sybil attack in which a single malicious node forges multiple
identities to disrupt network operation. This type of attack is
easily perpetrated in WSNs due to unstructured environment,
distribute deployment of nodes and broadcast nature of data
transmission. Furthermore, Sybil attacks do not require any
specialized hardware but have the capability to wreak havoc
by influencing the outcome of network operations such as data
aggregation, voting and fair resource utilization.
In this paper, we have proposed a lightweight scheme for
Sybil attack detection and its application to a centralized
clustering-based hierarchical network. Our proposed scheme
can detect Sybil nodes based on the signal strength of received
packets. The collaboration of any two high energy nodes
is required to determine the types of nodes in a network.
These high energy nodes assist the base station in Sybil
nodes detection and enable it to prevent such nodes from
participation in cluster head selection. The candidate nodes for
cluster heads are evaluated based on their residual energies,
geographical locations and previous history of selection. In
each round, an optimal number of cluster heads are selected
using a balanced-clustering technique which enhances network
lifetime and energy consumption. The proposed scheme can
further be extended by incorporating mobility in it. The
presence of mobile nodes in a network will require monitoring
its coordinates on regular basis for calculating the Euclidean
distance. Furthermore, mobile nodes in one cluster may belong
to another cluster in the next round which may not result
in balanced clusters. Moreover, a Sybil node will always try
to sneak through the detection process. Currently, we are
analyzing a scenario where an adversary somehow deceives
high energy nodes and elects itself as cluster head.
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